AfCFTA: A pan-African dream under influence?

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bilaterals.org, 17 september 2025

AfCFTA: A pan-African dream under influence?

Launched as the flagship project of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) [1] aims to serve as the foundation for a vast common market among the organisation’s member states. Described as a historic turning point for the continent’s economic unity, the AfCFTA aspires to stimulate intra-African trade, promote industrialisation, and generate new growth dynamics.

But beyond the pan-African rhetoric often associated with this mega-project, the AfCFTA is essentially a fairly standard free trade agreement, attracting multiple geopolitical influences and interests. Backed by proponents of free trade ideology, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), international financial institutions, and the European Union (EU), it receives various forms of financial and technical support.

The growing involvement of external actors in its financing, as well as in the negotiation and implementation process, raises concerns about neocolonial influence and the risk of alignment with the agendas of imperialist powers.

So, is the AfCFTA truly an autonomous African initiative that serves the peoples of the continent, or is it merely another tool for maintaining the dominant global economic order?

1. Genesis of the AfCFTA: Pan-african ambitions and market logics

The AfCFTA was adopted at the 2018 Kigali Summit and entered into force in 2019. However, its implementation remains quite slow and must be completed with additional protocols and annexes, some of which are still under negotiation [2]. Only modest trade exchanges have been established between ten countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Egypt, Tanzania, Tunisia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Nigeria, and Mauritius) under the "Guided Trade Initiative" to test the various operational, institutional, legal, and trade policy components of this agreement in practice.

The main objectives of the AfCFTA include:

The gradual elimination of 97% of tariffs by 2034 (90% of non-sensitive products and 7% of sensitive products)
The liberalisation of trade in goods and services.
The creation of an attractive space for investments (which encourages special economic zones)
The stimulation of continental industrial competitiveness.

The pan-African rhetoric and the ambitions for the continent’s economic empowerment, primarily promoted by the AfCFTA supporters, quickly clashed with the neoliberal logics and asymmetric partnerships proposed by this agreement.

In reality, the African Continental Free Trade Area is far from being a space of solidarity. Based on the same principles promoted by the WTO and bilateral trade agreements, it perpetuates an economic model that has historically disadvantaged African economies to the benefit of colonial and imperialist powers [3] [4].

Accelerated liberalisation without industrial or productive capacity, opening up to the international market and foreign investment without strategic protectionism, and normative harmonisation inspired by Western standards consolidate a system of unequal exchange. This agreement, modelled on free trade agreements, risks further entrenching this centre-periphery logic whereby African economies are maintained in the role of suppliers of raw materials and consumers of imported processed goods, while enabling foreign multinationals and a minority of local elites connected to global circuits to reap the benefits.

Furthermore, the asymmetry between different African economies, in terms of integration into the international market, industrialisation, or social protection, poses a real challenge regarding the exacerbation of pre-existing imbalances. In 2024, Southern Africa held a dominant position in intra-African trade, accounting for 41.4% of all exchanges between countries on the continent, followed by West Africa (approximately 25%), East Africa (14%), North Africa (12%), and Central Africa (6.6%). South Africa alone represents 19.1% of intra-African trade [5].

Seventy-five per cent of intra-African trade remains dominated by countries with a more developed industrial sector and relatively efficient infrastructure, such as South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya. Conversely, countries like Chad, Burundi, and the Central African Republic have weak industrial capacity and are increasingly dependent on imports, with limited access to energy and logistics infrastructure [6]. They will also be forced to open their markets before acquiring production or transformation capacities. This structural imbalance risks transforming these countries into mere consumer markets and annihilating the most fragile economies. Peasants, artisans, and small traders, who constitute a large part of the real economic structure in Africa, will be the first affected by the economic and social dumping that will be aggravated by the AfCFTA.
Rather than creating an economic unity, this free trade agreement risks establishing a hierarchical market, where the winners are the already integrated economies, transnational corporations, and urban elites connected to global flows, at the expense of rural margins and fragile economies [7].

2. African project largely supported by external actors

While the AfCFTA is institutionally led by the African Union, it is not immune to the influence or intervention of external actors. Since its inception, the African free trade area has attracted the attention of major economic powers and multilateral institutions, which recognise the strategic importance in accessing a large market, securing their supply of raw materials, and countering rival geopolitical influence.

a. The United States:

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report [8] from the US Congress is an important source for understanding the strategic objectives of the United States regarding the AfCFTA. In 2019, a joint US-AU statement presented the AfCFTA as a "common goal," emphasising its role in "increasing Africa’s attractiveness to US businesses”.

The United States sees the AfCFTA as an opportunity to strengthen its economic presence in Africa and compete with China’s growing influence.

“The AfCFTA is primarily designed to foster trade-centered growth within Africa, but its successful realisation could benefit the U.S. private sector and advance long-standing congressionally supported U.S. policy goals for the region.… Such outcomes could expand US market access to and trade with Africa, decrease the need for US development assistance in the region, diversify U.S. supply chains, and increase reciprocal opportunities for US-African trade and investment expansion.”

While the report does not cite a comprehensive source of data on funding or US activities specifically dedicated to the AfCFTA, it does mention various support programmes and mechanisms. It specifies that USAID, Prosper Africa [9], and other economic development agencies support the implementation of the AfCFTA through capacity building programs, digitalisation, regulatory upgrades, and so on. Programmes established by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), for example, encourage trade integration favourable to US exports (especially in agribusiness and technology).

Furthermore, this support is part of broader US efforts under "trade capacity building," referring to a range of activities that promote the greater integration of foreign countries into international trade. For African countries, this programme primarily concerns: trade-related infrastructure, agriculture, enterprise development, competition policies, and the business environment. Through these activities, the US influences market-based economic reforms to increase its trade and investment opportunities abroad.

These support mechanisms clearly promote free trade models aligned with US standards (e.g., intellectual property rights, openness to foreign investment), without necessarily serving African industrial priorities.

Trump’s tariff war could call these initiatives into question. The AU is advocating a unified approach and proposes the AfCFTA treaty as a basis for negotiation. But the discourse of African unity is once again being shaken by pressures, with some countries more dependent on exports to the US not hiding their willingness to negotiate separately (including Kenya and South Africa). Meanwhile,Trump has offered the leaders of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal new bilateral agreements. Nevertheless this policy confirms the continuation of US interests on the continent.

b. The European Union:

According to the same report, the EU is pursuing a similar strategy. It is one of the main funders of the AfCFTA, often linking aid to liberal structural reforms. Between 2014 and 2020, €74 million were deployed for AfCFTA-related projects, including:

Harmonisation of rules of origin (criticised for favoring European products).

Strengthening of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards and intellectual property rights modelled on European standards, which can exclude small African producers.

The African Trade Observatory, which is funded by the EU to monitor regional integration and tariff negotiations.

At the AU-EU ministerial meeting in May 2025, the AfCFTA was presented as the cornerstone of their joint strategy, which aligns with the EU’s "Global Gateway." This initiative mobilises €150 billion of investment in Africa under the "EU-Africa Investment Package" which covers 11 key sectors, including energy, health, infrastructure, and digitalisation [10].

Key projects include: the Lobito Corridor [11], connecting Angola, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to support mineral exports and regional trade; the Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya interconnection, aiming to boost the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative, which secured €20 billion to deploy 50 GW of renewable energy and connect 100 million Africans by 2030 [12].

An additional aid of €1.1 billion, under the "Team Europe" initiative, has been provided since 2024. It aims to accelerate the implementation of the AfCFTA and involves collaboration with EU member states, including Denmark, Germany, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden [13].

Simultaneously, the EU continues to impose Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that force African countries to open their markets to European products, thereby weakening local industries [14].

c. China:

Similarly, China actively supports the AfCFTA, seeking access to resources and new markets for its corporations. It takes a less direct, yet equally strategic, approach via loans for infrastructure development and trade agreements.

The CRS report highlights that Beijing has provided financial support to the AfCFTA Secretariat since its creation, and has signed memoranda of understanding to share its expertise on key issues such as intellectual property, customs, digital trade, and competition policy.

This involvement is perfectly consistent with China’s position as Africa’s leading trading partner: in 2021, its bilateral trade reached $254 billion, nearly four times the volume of trade with the United States ($64 billion) [15].

Beyond the institutional dimension, China is investing heavily in infrastructure projects through the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the New Silk Road, including railway, port, and road projects (such as the Nairobi-Mombasa line or the East-West Highway in Algeria). These infrastructures directly serve the AfCFTA by facilitating intra-African trade, but they especially allow Chinese companies to capture a large share of the value added in production, logistics, and related services.

Unlike the United States, which pursues a policy of trade arm-wrestling, notably with the uncertain future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and by imposing punitive tariffs on its economic rivals, including China itself, Beijing has opted for a strategy of openness towards Africa . In June 2025, it announced its intention to eliminate tariffs on all imports from Africa [16]. This policy aims to further consolidate China’s role as Africa’s main economic partner.

d. The role of International Institutions:

Several multilateral institutions and international organizations have provided support to the AU and AfCFTA member countries. For example, the accession of 40 African countries to the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), whose objectives converge with those of the AfCFTA, has enabled the provision of technical and normative support.

Likewise, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) published a guide on national utilisation strategies for the AfCFTA and collaborates closely with its Secretariat, particularly in the context of post-COVID recovery policies.

The International Trade Centre (ITC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have formed strategic partnerships with the AfCFTA Secretariat to promote trade for women and youth, and to strengthen the capacity of national and regional institutions [17] [18]. These organisations are said to have contributed to the drafting of the AfCFTA Protocol on Women in Trade.

The World Bank is a major creditor for this project. In 2024, the World Bank allocated a $131 million grant to "facilitate the implementation" of the AfCFTA. The African Union and the World Bank have a long-standing partnership, and have worked together on many initiatives such as providing funding key sectoral programmes, including $13 million to strengthen food resilience and promote technological innovation in agriculture; $12 million for the empowerment of girls and women in East Africa through a framework aligned with the Maputo Protocol; $6 million for digital integration in West Africa with the aim to create a continental digital market by 2030; and $50 million to support the AfCFTA Secretariat in implementing regional integration protocols, free movement, and the African Single Air Transport Market [19].

However these interventions are not neutral. They often condition access to financing on the adoption of norms that are compatible with international standards, dominated by Global North countries. For example, the removal of non-tariff barriers, including those that protect nascent industries,and the prioritisation of major trade corridors likely to favour exporting multinationals. Studies produced by the World Bank tout potential benefits (+81% increase in intra-African trade), while downplaying negative effects, such as dumping or the collapse of sensitive sectors like textiles, which are already weakened by massive imports from Asia.

e. Other donors

In a post-Brexit context, The United Kingdom allocated £35 million (2021–2026) to support the implementation of the AfCFTA, while securing favourable trade contracts. Germany contributed €34.5 million through the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) for training in trade negotiations, which often focused on the export of raw materials. Canada, for its part, injected $15 million through the UN Economic Commission for Africa to support "trade strategies" in line with with its mining interests on the continent.

Conclusion

The AfCFTA encapsulates the contradiction between pan-African aspirations and the neoliberal dynamics that perpetuates dependency and inequalities. Despite its African roots, which gives it a certain legitimacy, its content, mechanisms, and funding modalities form part of a continuum of liberalisation and opening-up policies largely encouraged and financed by imperialist powers.

Although seemingly technical or neutral, this funding guides economic priorities and the norms to be adopted. Whether in customs standards, sanitary rules, digital integration, or trade and investment policy, these frameworks reflect the interests of donor countries more than African realities and needs.

Caught in a spiral of debt and austerity, many African countries have limited budgetary resources to invest in infrastructure or industrialisation, pushing them towards conditional foreign funding and expertise. In fact, the AfCFTA cannot break away from the dominant global economic order; rather it perpetuates the continent’s subordinate integration and neocolonial dependency. Therefore it is crucial to adopt a more critical perspective in order to reinvent a more egalitarian cooperation in the spirit of a truly emancipatory Pan-Africanism.