The EU–Morocco agreement is illegal and unjust
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The EU–Morocco agreement is illegal and unjust
by bilaterals.org, 5 January 2026
After nearly a decade of legal proceedings, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in October 2024 to annul the 2019 trade agreements between the European Union and Morocco covering agricultural and fisheries products. The court found that Western Sahara could be included in such agreements only under two strict conditions: first, that the Sahrawi people be genuinely involved in the negotiation process and receive a share of the resulting economic benefits; and second, that product labeling comply with international law by clearly distinguishing goods originating in Western Sahara from those produced in internationally recognised Moroccan territory.
One year later, however, the European Commission and the Moroccan government concluded a new arrangement that seemingly reinstated the invalidated provisions under a different guise. Framed as a compromise, the deal includes European funding described as humanitarian assistance for Sahrawi refugee camps, as well as financing for infrastructure projects in the occupied territory. It also introduces a new administrative classification, creating two regions of origin — Dakhla and Laayoune — under the designation “Moroccan Grand South,” a term widely disputed given the territory’s unresolved international status.
On November 26, an effort to block the agreement in the European Parliament failed by a single vote, underscoring the deep and persistent divisions within European institutions over Western Sahara.
Bilaterals.org spoke with Mohamed Ould Cherif, director of the Franco-Sahrawi Center for Studies and Documentation Ahmed Baba Miské; and Jean Thévenot, a farmer with the Confédération paysanne in France’s Basque Country and a board member of the European Coordination Via Campesina.
How do you assess the European Commission’s attempt to circumvent the European Court of Justice ruling on Western Sahara in the context of the EU–Morocco trade agreement?
Mohamed Ould Cherif: The rulings issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union on October 4, 2024, leave no room for ambiguity: the consent of the Sahrawi people — or of their internationally recognised representative, the Polisario Front — is an absolute prerequisite for any agreement between the European Union and Morocco that includes Western Sahara.
The agreement recently concluded nonetheless extends its effects to that territory. In doing so, it represents a clear circumvention of established European case law and a direct violation of the court’s decisions. This approach not only weakens the authority of Europe’s judicial institutions but also contributes to the erosion of the international legal order painstakingly constructed by the United Nations over decades. It reflects what might be described as a “Trumpian” unraveling of international norms — a broader trend in which multilateral institutions and international law are increasingly disregarded.
Jean Thévenot: The Commission has tried — very unsuccessfully, to be honest — to address the two requirements set out by the Court, in the hope of keeping the agreement in force while continuing to include Western Sahara. To that end, it recently modified labeling rules by creating two new so-called regions of origin — Dakhla and Laayoune — under the label “Moroccan Grand South.”
But that is not what the Court required. The ruling was explicit: products imported from Western Sahara may enter the EU only if they are clearly labeled as originating in Western Sahara, not Morocco. Because Moroccan authorities categorically refuse to allow the term “Western Sahara” to appear on labels, the Commission has attempted to devise a workaround. Either it is openly disregarding the Court, or it recognises that it cannot meet the legal requirements and is attempting to bypass them.
Has the European Commission lost credibility, particularly with Europe’s agricultural sector?
J.T.: It is now clear that the current Commission has chosen to prioritise industrial interests over agriculture. The EU–Mercosur agreement is a prime example: it benefits industry—especially German industry — while harming European farmers. The proposal of a multibillion-euro safeguard fund for agriculture is itself an acknowledgment of these negative effects.
With regard to the EU–Morocco agreement, the stance of COPA-COGECA, the main European agribusiness lobby, is particularly ambiguous. While Morocco mainly exports horticultural products to the EU, the European Union exports large volumes of cereals — especially French wheat — to Morocco. This helps explain why the influential French agricultural lobby FNSEA, a COPA-COGECA member, and major grain producers strongly support maintaining the agreement.
M.O.C.: The Commission appears to operate primarily in response to lobbying pressures and the interests of the most influential member states. This explains both its general orientation and its dismissive attitude toward the demands of French farmers and the Sahrawi people. Neither group possesses sufficient political or media leverage to significantly affect decision-making, allowing the Commission to sidestep binding judicial rulings by adopting a strategy of delay.
This dynamic undermines the European Union’s credibility when it comes to respecting international law and its own courts. It also reveals a troubling institutional divide between the European Commission and the Court of Justice, reflecting deeper tensions over the interpretation and application of the law. What we are witnessing is a short-term, lobby-driven logic that prioritises immediate economic interests over institutional integrity and legal consistency. One might have expected member states, whose governments are democratically elected, to act as a counterweight. Their silence instead suggests a retreat from core responsibilities.
More broadly, this reflects a drift toward unrestrained capitalism, in which states—nominally tasked with protecting the public interest and common goods—are reduced to passive actors, while market forces and lobbying networks shape political and legal outcomes.
What is the current state of agriculture in Western Sahara? How do Sahrawi farmers compare with Moroccan settlers?
M.O.C.: There are essentially two agricultural systems in Western Sahara, mirroring the reality of occupation. The first is traditional, fragile, and largely Sahrawi. It is based on nomadic pastoralism and customary practices, with extensive land use but limited irrigation and technology. Its roots predate the early twentieth century. The second is an industrial, export-oriented agriculture — greenhouses, soilless cultivation, aquaculture — that has expanded rapidly since the early 2000s. This sector is concentrated around Dakhla and driven by external capital, including investments linked to the Moroccan royal family, as documented in a study by the Erasmus School. Companies such as Azura have established operations in this context, despite their legal contestation.
This dual system produces deep structural inequalities. Industrial plantations benefit from land concessions, water infrastructure, and substantial investment, while Sahrawi farmers face shrinking access to land and water, and see their customary land rights ignored.
The composition of the labour force is also critical. Workers in modern agricultural operations are predominantly brought in from Morocco, reinforcing settlement dynamics and the economic marginalisation of the indigenous population. As recent research on settler colonialism suggests, agricultural “modernisation” functions as a political tool: industrial development and settler agriculture help entrench an economic and demographic presence that normalises the occupation.
These studies emphasise the need for independent water audits, recognition of customary land rights — since Morocco, like Israel, engages in expropriation of Sahrawi agricultural land — and robust traceability mechanisms to prevent commercial validation of activities carried out without Sahrawi consent.
What are your main objections to this agreement?
M.O.C.: There are three fundamental objections. First, the agreement is illegal, as it violates clear CJEU rulings by including Western Sahara without the consent of its people. Second, it has serious political consequences, weakening the UN peace process and damaging the European Union’s credibility as a defender of international law. Third, it is socially and economically unjust, benefiting powerful lobbies while marginalizing both European farmers and the Sahrawi population.
J.T.: The Confédération paysanne opposes free-trade agreements in principle, because they consistently benefit multinational corporations rather than peoples. In the case of Morocco, it is not the role of a French agricultural union to defend the rights of the Sahrawi people per se, even though we stand in solidarity with them.
Our initial concern was the impact of tomato imports on European production. As we explored ways to challenge the agreement, we realised that the Western Sahara issue offered a legal and political avenue — one that also aligned with our core values: respect for peoples’ sovereignty, international law, the United Nations, and multilateralism. Supporting the Sahrawi people therefore followed logically.
During our action on November 26 against the company Azura, two struggles converged. Before the Court of Justice, there were two plaintiffs: the Confédération paysanne and the Polisario Front. The Court heard the cases together because they were interconnected. Today, there is a clear convergence of interests between the Polisario Front and organizations such as the Confédération paysanne and Via Campesina.
The Confédération paysanne has taken action against Azura. What role does the company play?
M.O.C.: Azura is a Franco-Moroccan agribusiness group specializing in the production and export of cherry tomatoes, aromatic herbs, and clams. The criticism it faces does not concern agriculture itself, but the fact that some of its operations are located in Western Sahara, a territory the United Nations recognises as non-self-governing and whose status remains unresolved.
J.T.: Azura produces the small trays of cherry tomatoes sold for 99 cents or one euro in supermarkets across France. It is a mass-market product found almost everywhere, and in that sense Azura has become emblematic of the free-trade agreement.
When the Commission renegotiated amendments to the agreement in September, the process was conducted in complete opacity. Azura’s lobbyists were present at the negotiating table, while the Polisario Front — the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people — was excluded. That speaks volumes about how the Commission operates.
Azura maintains close ties to the Moroccan royal family and has taken a political position in the conflict. It also has French shareholders and a long-standing corporate presence in France. The vast majority of tomatoes imported into the EU from both Morocco and Western Sahara pass through Azura and transit via Perpignan. This places the company at the center of the system.
M.O.C.: The criticisms directed at Azura echo those leveled at other companies operating in violation of international law. What sets Azura apart is its direct role in the settlement process, particularly through the importation of Moroccan labour into occupied Western Sahara. Its activities are also highly water-intensive, placing significant strain on local aquifers, and rely on environmentally harmful inputs.
The November 26 vote at the European Parliament failed by one vote. Is there still a chance to stop the agreement?
J.T.: Paradoxically, the November 26 vote was not the most decisive one. It concerned labeling rules. Under EU law, products must normally indicate their country of origin. In this case, an exception was created for Morocco, allowing products from Western Sahara to omit that designation and instead list the region of origin as “Moroccan Grand South.”
This represents a modification of EU regulations themselves. While 359 Members of Parliament voted against the change and only 188 in favor, a qualified majority was required.
A second vote, expected in early 2026, will address the issue of benefits for the Sahrawi people. The Commission claims that EU funds will be invested in infrastructure projects in Western Sahara. The Polisario Front has pointed out that the Court required its consultation and participation, which has not occurred. Moreover, the proposed “benefits” would largely be channeled into seawater desalination plants.
M.O.C.: There is still a window of opportunity, but it will require a coordinated strategy combining political pressure, legal action, and public, media, and economic mobilisation. If opponents succeed in transforming the current relative majority into an absolute one, or in securing judicial suspensions, the agreement could be blocked or renegotiated. If not, it may enter into force despite significant resistance.
Are further initiatives planned?
J.T.: For now, our focus is on advocacy at the European level.
M.O.C.: We are supporting civil society efforts to raise awareness about compliance with the CJEU ruling and to oppose the illegal exploitation of resources in occupied Western Sahara, through advisory work and the production of analytical briefing papers across political and social domains.
