Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Concerns in Agricultural Trade

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Summary

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures refer to any of the laws, rules, standards, and procedures that governments employ to protect humans, other animals, and plants from diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. Examples of SPS measures include meat and poultry processing standards to reduce pathogens, residue limits for pesticides in foods, and regulation of agricultural biotechnology.

SPS measures can be barriers to trade in agricultural, food, and other products, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and others. Notable U.S. disputes include a European Union (EU) ban on U.S. meats treated with growth-promoting hormones, which a WTO dispute panel ruled had not been supported by a risk assessment; and a recent EU moratorium on approvals of biotechnology products. Foreign countries often object to various U.S. SPS measures as well.

Multilateral trade rules allow governments to adopt measures to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, provided that they do not discriminate or use them as disguised protectionism. This principle was clarified in 1994 by WTO members’ adoption, along with the other so-called Uruguay Round Agreements, of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This document sets out the basic rules for ensuring that each country’s food safety and animal and plant health laws and regulations are transparent, scientifically defensible, and fair. The United States also has signed, or is negotiating, numerous regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) that may contain SPS language.

The United States participates actively in the three major international scientific bodies designated by the WTO to deal with SPS matters: the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety, the Office of International Epizootics (OIE) for animal health and diseases, and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health. These bodies meet often to discuss threats to human and agricultural health, evaluate SPS-related disputes, and develop common, scientifically based SPS standards. Such standards can provide guidance for countries formulating their own national SPS measures and help resolve trade disputes.

Although U.S. WTO officials frequently cite the benefits of SPS cooperation under trade agreements, some, among them food safety and environmental advocacy organizations, have been skeptical. They have argued that implementation of the agreements can result in “downward harmonization” rather than upgraded health and safety standards. Defenders counter that trade rules explicitly recognize the right of individual nations to enact stronger protections than international guidelines if they believe they are appropriate and are justified by scientific risk assessment.

In Congress, which must approve legislation if a trade agreement is to be implemented, many Members are interested in how the FTAs might address SPS matters. These Members are concerned that as trade agreements lower agricultural tariffs, more countries may turn to SPS measures to protect their farmers from import competition. This report will not be updated.
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Concerns in Agricultural Trade

What Are Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures?

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures refer to any of the laws, rules, standards, and procedures that governments employ to protect humans, other animals, and plants from diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. Examples of common SPS measures include meat and poultry processing standards to reduce pathogens, residue limits for pesticides in foods, fumigation requirements for grains and wood packing materials to kill pests, restrictions on food and animal feed additives, and regulation of agricultural biotechnology, to name a few.

International trade rules recognize the rights and obligations of governments to adopt and enforce such requirements. These rules are spelled out primarily in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). However, a WTO fact sheet notes that countries can wield SPS measures as barriers to trade in agricultural, food, and other products:

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, by their very nature, may result in restrictions on trade. All governments accept the fact that some trade restrictions may be necessary to ensure food safety and animal and plant health protection. However, governments are sometimes pressured to go beyond what is needed for health protection and to use sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions to shield domestic producers from economic competition. Such pressure is likely to increase as other trade barriers are reduced as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. A sanitary or phytosanitary restriction which is not actually required for health reasons can be a very effective protectionist device, and because of its technical complexity, a particularly deceptive and difficult barrier to challenge.1

Technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are a related but different category of potential trade barriers. TBTs also are used by governments to regulate markets, protect consumers, and preserve natural resources, but not all TBTs are agricultural: automobile safety standards, cigarette labeling, and pharmaceutical regulations are examples of nonagricultural measures. Examples of TBTs that may affect trade in agricultural and food products include food ingredient or labeling requirements, nutrition claims, quality attributes, animal welfare rules, and packaging regulations.2

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1 Excerpted from Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, at the WTO website, [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm]. The WTO is the global organization that administers the internationally agreed-upon rules of trade between nations.

2 A different WTO agreement, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, covers TBTs, (continued...)
As trade between two countries expands, more opportunities for disputes may arise. More than 60% of all U.S. agricultural trade in calendar year 2005 occurred between the United States and just five other markets: Canada (two-way trade of $22.8 billion), the European Union (EU; $20.2 billion), Mexico ($17.7 billion), Japan ($8.3 billion) and China ($7.1 billion). So it may be no surprise that many of these countries have been cited for numerous SPS-related barriers to imports of U.S. farm and food products. However, similar barriers exist among many other U.S. agricultural trading partners as well.

Following are narrative examples of several recent SPS problems U.S. exporters have encountered in overseas markets. For a more extensive listing of SPS barriers and food-related TBTs between the United States and its top 25 agricultural trading partners, see Appendix A.

**BSE-Related Beef Bans.** After USDA reported, in December 2003, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease) in a Washington dairy cow imported from Canada, most countries banned U.S. beef and cattle products. These included Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and Canada, which together had purchased approximately 90% of U.S. beef exports. Only two additional BSE cases have been found among more than 700,000 U.S. cattle tested over two years. While a growing number of countries, including Mexico and Canada, are again accepting some types of U.S. beef and/or live cattle, others were not as of spring 2006. This is despite extensive U.S. evidence that the products are safe and that U.S. human and animal health safeguards are effective. The BSE-related bans caused losses to the U.S. beef industry in 2004 estimated at between $3.2 billion to $4.7 billion.

**EU Meat Hormone Dispute.** The EU in 1989 implemented a ban on the production and importation of meat from livestock treated with growth-promoting hormones. The ban caused an estimated $100-$200 million in lost U.S. exports annually. The EU justified the ban to protect the health and safety of consumers, but several WTO dispute settlement panels subsequently ruled that the ban lacked scientific justification and was inconsistent with WTO trade rules. The EU refused to remove the ban, and the United States declined an EU offer of compensation in the form of an expanded quota for hormone-free beef. The U.S. government was granted the right to, and did, impose 100% retaliatory tariffs on $116 million of EU

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2 (...continued) including those related to food. Although this CRS report refers to TBTs, the primary focus is on SPS measures.


4 U.S. officials were hopeful in late May 2006 that the Japanese and Korean markets would soon reopen. See CRS Report RS22345, BSE (“Mad Cow Disease”): A Brief Overview, by Geoffrey S. Becker, and CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by Charles E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker, for more information and citations.
agricultural imports. Efforts by both sides to resolve this long-running dispute so far have not succeeded.\(^5\)

**EU Biotechnology Approvals.** In May 2003, in WTO dispute settlement, the United States, along with Canada and Argentina, challenged the EU’s de facto moratorium since 1998 on biotechnology product approvals. Although the EU claimed to have lifted the moratorium in May 2004 by approving a genetically engineered (GE) corn variety, the three complainants pursued the case, in part because a number of EU member states continue to block biotech products, even those the EU itself deems acceptable. The moratorium reportedly has cost U.S. corn growers some $300 million in exports to the EU annually. The EU approach presumes that the products of biotechnology are inherently different from their conventional counterparts and should be more closely regulated; the United States, Canada, and Argentina believe they are not. On February 7, 2006, the WTO dispute panel agreed in part with the complainants’ arguments, ruling in its interim confidential report that a moratorium had existed, that bans on EU-approved GE crops in six EU member countries violated WTO rules, and that the EU failed to ensure that its approval procedures were conducted without “undue delay.”\(^6\)

**China Poultry Measures.** China in early 2004 had imposed a ban on poultry imported from anywhere in the United States after a case of low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) was found in Delaware. The U.S. government declared that China had demonstrated progress in following international standards after it lifted the nationwide ban in late 2004, keeping it in place only for poultry from states with LPAI. However, China now is enforcing zero-tolerance standards for certain pathogens (e.g., *Salmonella* and *E. coli O157:H7*) in raw meat and poultry products, which has resulted in the suspension of more than one dozen U.S. meat and poultry facilities. The United States believes that a zero tolerance is not achievable for some pathogens in all products; some levels may be unavoidable and do not present an unacceptable risk to consumers. Moreover, argues the United States, the Chinese may not be enforcing the standards consistently or applying them equally to domestic poultry products.\(^7\)

**EU Wood Packing.** One looming concern has been an EU directive that was to take effect in March 2005. Intended to prevent the introduction of pests associated with wood packaging material (packing cases, crates, drums, pallets, load boards and pallet collars), the directive contains a controversial requirement that all such packaging be made from debarked wood. The United States and other WTO members believe the directive is scientifically unjustified and note that international

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standards call for only two pest control measures: heat treatment and fumigation by methyl bromide. The EU has since postponed application of the debarking requirement until January 1, 2009, to provide the international organization that sets plant health standards more time to evaluate the merits of such a requirement. At stake are an estimated $80 billion worth of U.S. agricultural and commercial exports to the EU that are shipped on wooden pallets or in wood packaging materials.8

Other nations have argued that the United States maintains its own — in their view, frequently unjustifiable — SPS measures and TBTs. Examples they proffer include a prohibition against shrimp imports from Southeast Asian countries because their trawlers do not use the type of nets required of U.S. shrimpers to protect sea turtles (the WTO has since ruled that the ban was applied in a discriminatory manner); overly burdensome animal disease rules affecting EU imports; pending mandatory country-of-origin labeling on fresh meats and products; and U.S. import restrictions against more than 100 products because foreign pest risk analyses have not been completed. Noting that agricultural trade must freely move in both directions, many analysts argue that if U.S. challenges to other nations’ measures are to have credibility, U.S. interests must be prepared to acknowledge their own barriers and to negotiate their removal.

Measuring Economic Impacts

SPS barriers and agriculture-related TBTs can impose significant economic costs on agricultural and food exporters, by forcing them to make expensive changes in production or marketing in order to comply. A foreign SPS action can halt all imports of a product, resulting in major losses for the exporting industry.

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) annually publishes a lengthy report documenting foreign trade and investment barriers and U.S. efforts to reduce them. This report, required by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418), categorizes, describes, and in some cases quantifies these barriers on a country-by-country basis. Sixty-two major trading partners are covered in the 2006 report.9 SPS measures and TBTs are generally detailed in each country’s profile and, where feasible, their impacts on U.S. exports are quantified by USTR.

Understanding the total costs of agricultural non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as SPS and TBT measures can be helpful for gauging the overall level of trade protection that various countries enjoy, and for determining how much importance to assign to reducing such barriers in trade negotiations. However, efforts to inventory and quantify these barriers have proven challenging. One difficulty is that, “since NTBs lack tariffs’ transparency and are often embedded within complex


regulatory schemes, reducing these NTBs generally requires more work than reducing tariffs does.”

Two USDA agencies, the Economic Research Service (ERS) and the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), attempted to estimate the impacts on U.S. exports in 1996, using information gathered from, among other sources, USDA’s foreign agricultural attaches and industry groups. Working from that database, FAS found in 1997 more than 350 measures negatively affecting an estimated $5.8 billion in potential U.S. agricultural exports. East Asia had the most technical barriers, with an estimated impact on U.S. exports of nearly $2.9 billion. The Americas accounted for nearly $1.3 billion and Europe for more than $900 million. Processed products accounted for about $1.3 billion of the $5.8 billion total. Others were grains and oilseeds (about $1.3 billion); animal products (nearly $900 million); fruits and vegetables (over $600 million); and “other products” including cotton, seeds, nuts, fish and forestry products (about $1 billion in all).

Several more recent studies have attempted to estimate the trade losses of all food-related NTBs — not only SPS measures and TBTs but also import quotas, safeguard measures, licensing rules, and so forth. One, by Bradford, uses internationally comparable price data to estimate the tariff equivalents of the food-related NTBs employed by nine “rich” nations of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). Bradford’s computer simulation suggests that if all food NTBs there were removed, economic welfare would increase annually by $185 billion in eight of these “rich” countries and by $50 billion in less developed countries. Bradford finds that Japan and the EU have the highest levels of non-tariff protection, while the United States has the lowest among the countries studied.

The U.S. SPS Framework

The United States, like other countries, has in place an extensive, often intersecting, system to protect consumers from unsafe food and agricultural products and to protect its animal and plant resources from foreign pests and diseases. A variety of statutes and implementing regulations, directives, and administrative procedures underpin this system. These essentially constitute the nation’s SPS measures. Major authorities are briefly described below.


11 See, for example, David Orden and Donna Roberts, Foreword to Understanding Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade, proceedings of a conference of the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, January 1997; Roberts and Kate DeRemer, Overview of Technical Barriers to U.S. Agricultural Exports (Staff Paper AGES-9705), March 1997; Roberts, Timothy E. Josling, and David Orden, A Framework for Analyzing Technical Trade Barriers in Agricultural Markets (Technical Bulletin 1876).

12 The Extent and Impact of Food Non-Tariff Barriers in Rich Countries.
At the same time, U.S. officials work cooperatively with other governments, frequently within international scientific bodies, to develop commonly recognized guidelines for SPS measures (and TBTs) that will promote balanced but safe trade in plants, animals, agricultural and food products.

**U.S. Regulatory System**

**Food and Agricultural Products.** Within the Department of Health and Human Services, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversees the safety of most human and animal foods and drugs, primarily under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §301 *et seq.*). The primary exceptions are meat and poultry and their products, which are regulated by USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. §601 *et seq.*) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. §451 *et seq.*). USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has lead responsibility for animal and plant health under the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §8301 *et seq.*) and the Federal Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §7701 *et seq.*). Pesticides are regulated by the independent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. §136 *et seq.*).

Each of the responsible agencies has promulgated an extensive body of regulations to implement these laws, all of which apply to imports as well as domestic products. For example, plants, animals, and their products require an APHIS import permit. Whether a product can be imported and the conditions for entry are dependent upon an APHIS risk assessment of a product and where it originated, taking into account internationally recognized scientific guidelines (i.e., those established in the international animal health organization OIE and in the International Plant Protection Convention, or IPPC), usually culminating with formal rules in the Federal Register. FSIS evaluates foreign meat and poultry programs to ensure their equivalency with U.S. requirements and reinspects samples at the border.

**Biotechnology.** The basic federal guidance for regulating biotechnology products is the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (51 Fed. Reg. 23302), published in 1986 by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). A key principle is that genetically engineered products should continue to be regulated according to their characteristics and unique features, not their production method — that is, whether or not they were created through biotechnology. The framework relies on existing statutory authority (such as those noted above) and regulations to ensure the safety of biotechnology research and products, including food and agricultural products.13

**Homeland Security.** After the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, whose agents now play a major role in inspections of imports, including food and agricultural products. Most of APHIS’s border inspection functions and personnel were moved into the new department. Congress also passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and

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14 WTO members are required to notify the WTO of their SPS measure whenever there is no international standard or the SPS measure substantially differs from the international standard and the measure may have a significant effect on trade among WTO members (SPS Agreement, Annex B). See also “SPS Language in International Trade Agreements” later in this report. The United States made 345 SPS notifications between July 2003 and July 2005 alone, according to the WTO.
When SPS and TBT concerns arise, technical and other government officials usually initiate at least informal dialogue with countries concerning the measure in question. They also are communicating with affected industries in the private sector, both to keep them informed and to gather additional information. It is at this level that an SPS issue is most likely to be resolved when USDA or other government experts discuss its scientific aspects with their foreign counterparts. These staff-level discussions often help the importing and exporting parties to clarify their differences, and to determine mutually acceptable conditions for importing the affected product that will not compromise the importing party’s safeguards.

However, not all problems can be solved in this manner. Eventually, bilateral consultations with the foreign country over an outstanding SPS or TBT issue might be pursued by USTR, with USDA’s assistance. USTR also can decide at any point to elevate the issue via a complaint to the WTO or, if a Canadian or Mexican measure, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), triggering formal dispute resolution procedures.15 (Other FTAs generally defer dispute settlement to the WTO procedures.)

USDA officials noted that they have been taking a more “holistic” approach to SPS work than in the past. Rather than simply identifying and trying to fix each SPS-related trade problem as it arises, they attempt to forestall possible disputes by (1) cooperating with other governments in international scientific forums and (2) supporting “capacity building” within countries that lack satisfactory regulatory systems or that are new to the world trading system.16

**International Standards Bodies.** The three major international organizations for SPS are the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety, the Office of International Epizootics (OIE) for animal health and diseases, and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health. U.S. government scientists participate actively in these organizations, which meet periodically to discuss current and anticipated threats to human and agricultural health, evaluate SPS-related disputes, and develop common, scientifically based SPS standards. Such standards are voluntary and are intended to provide guidance for countries in formulating their own national SPS measures and, ultimately, to help resolve trade disputes.

For example, in 2004 and 2005, the United States joined with Canada and Mexico in gaining key changes to the OIE’s guidelines for recognizing the trade

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15 Sections 301 et seq. of the Trade Act of 1974 delineate the domestic legal authority and procedures for U.S. officials in investigating and challenging unfair trade practices, and enforcing U.S. rights under international trade agreements. Interested parties, including agricultural groups, can — and do — petition USTR to initiate such procedures under Section 301 if they believe that a challenge is warranted and that the Administration is not addressing the issue. For an explanation of Section 301, see House Committee on Ways and Means, *Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes* (WMCP 108-5), June 2003, beginning on page 119. See also CRS Report RL31296, *Trade Remedies and Agriculture*, by Geoffrey S. Becker and Charles E. Hanrahan.

status of countries with BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow disease). The new guidelines seek to emphasize the effectiveness of a country’s BSE safeguards rather than merely the number of cases it reports.17

**Trade Capacity Building.** WTO members have agreed to provide technical assistance and outreach to other members, particularly developing countries. Overarching objectives are to help them understand the SPS provisions in international agreements, their scientific basis, the fundamentals of risk assessment, and how to build and administer regulatory programs. USDA administers a number of programs to build foreign expertise in biotechnology, food safety, animal health, and plant health, such as the Cochran Fellowships, which train senior and mid-level agricultural officials from middle-income countries and emerging democracies.

The Agricultural Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; 19 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.) seeks to spur economic development and help integrate Africa into the world trading system through U.S. trade preferences and other benefits to Sub-Saharan African countries that meet certain criteria relating to market reform and human rights. Among many AGOA provisions are those which emphasize U.S. technical assistance to improve these countries’ compliance with U.S.-type SPS requirements.18

USDA’s holistic approach also likely will be reflected in a functional and management reorganization which FAS is planning to unveil in 2006. One of four major organizational components in the agency’s policy area will be a “scientific and technical affairs group” to continue as the industry portal for SPS and TBT issues and as the WTO enquiry point. Within the agency’s programs area, a “trade capacity and development group” will operate trade, science and regulatory capacity building projects overseas, including training and technical assistance.19 In addition, as described in its FY2007 budget submission to Congress, USDA for the first time has enunciated explicitly an SPS goal, to “support adoption and application of science-based SPS regulations to facilitate agricultural trade.”20

**SPS Accomplishments Report**

USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) publishes an annual report which attempts to document and quantify the value of its “accomplishments” in reducing SPS barriers. In FY2005, APHIS resolved 79 trade-related issues permitting U.S. exports valued at nearly $1.4 billion to occur in more than 44 countries, according to the report. More specifically:

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17 For a longer discussion and citations, see CRS Report RL32199, *Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or “Mad Cow Disease”): Current and Proposed Safeguards*, by Geoffrey S. Becker and Sarah A. Lister.

18 See, for example, CRS Report RL31772, *U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The Agricultural Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond* by Danielle Langton.


20 USDA, 2007 *Explanatory Notes*. 
• Fifty-three of these issues involved the retention of $480 million in sales to existing markets, including the reopening of a number of key beef and ruminant product markets that had closed due to concerns about BSE in the United States.

• Resolution of SPS concerns led to the expansion of existing product trade in 23 foreign markets, resulting in $896 million in additional exports. Among products that experienced expanded sales were citrus exports to China, hay to Japan, and wheat to Mexico.

• Three new markets valued at a total of $16 million in FY2005 were opened — U.S. apples gained entry to Japan after fireblight restrictions were eased; Mexico began accepting U.S. nectarines, plums, and peaches; and Korea has decided to allow imports of U.S. medical products of bovine origin.21

Asian markets accounted for 56% of these accomplishments (by value) in FY2005. Europe and the Middle East accounted for 26% and the Americas for 18%, according to the report. By value of product, 64% of the accomplishments were in fruits and vegetables, 24% in animal products, and 12% in grains and oilseeds.

The report also notes that APHIS implemented a number of changes to its own import requirements that provided new or expanded market access for nine countries and a total of nine commodities. This reverse trade was valued at nearly $1.3 billion in FY2005. APHIS stated that SPS changes have opened the U.S. border to clementines from Chile, orchids from Taiwan, and honeybees from New Zealand and Australia. Canada has gained expanded U.S. access for its beef and ruminants products, Mexico for avocados, and China for Ya pears, APHIS reported.

## SPS Provisions in International Trade Agreements

In recent years, the United States has concluded or is negotiating a growing number of multilateral, bilateral, and regional trade agreements. These agreements aim to reduce the tariffs, import quotas, and other barriers that countries use to limit imports and to protect their domestic industries, including agriculture. As tariffs decline or disappear, scrutiny can shift to use of SPS measures, which are another way nations may attempt to protect their domestic producers from import competition.22

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21 APHIS, SPS Accomplishments Report, Fiscal Year 2005 (published May 2006). More detailed breakouts by commodity and country appear in tables accompanying the report. The SPS issues in the report are limited to those for which APHIS has lead responsibility — i.e., animal and plant health but not food safety. APHIS states that no other agency publishes a similar SPS accomplishments report.

22 U.S. political leaders have sought multilateral, bilateral, and regional trade agreements to achieve several longstanding, and interrelated, trade policy objectives. These objectives are to expand markets for U.S. exports, protect domestic industries from unfair trade practices, promote world economic growth, and support foreign policy and national security. See, for example, CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and (continued...)
Present multilateral rules date back to the development and signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. A number of subsequent negotiating rounds led up to the establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995. The WTO is responsible for administering the multilateral agreements. The current set which now governs global trade are known collectively as the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreements. The UR Agreements are designed to set out clear (transparent) and fair trade rules and to eliminate policies that distort and reduce trade among countries. Examples of such policies may be domestic and export subsidies, import tariffs, import quotas, restrictions on foreign investment, arbitrary and unscientific regulations, among others. The agreements also spell out procedures for global trade cooperation, such as periodically reviewing individual countries’ trade commitments, policies and performance, and for resolution of trade disputes.

With regard to SPS measures, GATT Article XX allows governments to adopt measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided that they do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or use this as disguised protectionism. This principle was clarified in 1994 by WTO members’ adoption, along with the other UR agreements, of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). This document sets out the basic rules for ensuring that each member country’s food safety and animal and plant health laws and regulations are transparent, scientifically supportable, and fair.

**WTO (1994 Uruguay Round) SPS Provisions**

Among the areas covered by the SPS Agreement are the following.

**Basic Rights and Obligations.** Members have the right to take SPS measures “necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health,” as long as they are not inconsistent with the language of the SPS Agreement, are “based on scientific principles,” “not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,” “do not arbitrarily or unjustifia bly discriminate...,” and are “not applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade” (excerpts from Article 2). Members could have SPS measures that result in a higher level of protection than relevant international standards, but only under prescribed circumstances such as scientific justification (as in Article 3.3, under “Harmonization.”)

**Harmonization and Equivalence.** To facilitate trade, countries are encouraged to use relevant international standards and work toward harmonization — that is, the adoption of common SPS measures. To promote harmonization, the

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22 (...continued)


23 In 2006, approximately 150 countries were WTO members.

24 The text of the SPS agreement can be accessed through the following WTO website: [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sp_s_e/spsund_e.htm].
agreement cites, as sources of scientific expertise and globally recognized standards for food safety, Codex Alimentarius; for animal health and diseases, OIE; and for plant health, IPPC. Equivalence means that each importing country must accept the SPS measures of another country as equivalent to its own (even if they are not exactly the same), as long as the exporting country objectively demonstrates to the importing country that its measures achieve the same level of protection. (Harmonization and Equivalence are covered under Articles 3 and 4, respectively).

**Risk Assessment.** The agreement requires member countries to base their SPS measures on an appropriate assessment of the actual risks involved, taking into account internationally recognized risk assessment techniques (Article 5).

**Transparency.** In recognition that SPS regulations can be unclear or even capricious, countries must have a mechanism for notifying others in advance about measures that could affect trade, and providing a means to ask questions about, and comment on, them. Each must have an office, or “Enquiry Point,” to respond to requests for more information on new or existing measures (Article 7).

**Regionalization.** Until recently, a country tended to ban an entire country’s exports (of a product) from entry, if that product was associated with an unwanted pest or disease in the exporting country. That is, all such products from the exporting country were prohibited, even if they came from a region without the disease or pest. Regionalization provides for acceptance of such imports if the exporting country can demonstrate that they are from a disease-free or pest-free area (Article 6).

**Implementation and Oversight.** Within other articles of the agreement are provisions that permit developing countries to delay compliance with respect to SPS measures affecting imports, and that establish an SPS committee within the WTO to provide a forum for information exchange, to periodically review implementation of the agreement and governments’ compliance with it, to monitor progress in global harmonization of standards, and to work closely with the appropriate technical organizations on SPS matters. The committee has met approximately 35 times since the agreement’s inception.

**TBT Provisions**

Another UR document of related significance is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. It “protects the right of Members to adopt measures which ensure the quality of exports; protect human, animal, or plant life; protect the environment; or prevent deceptive practices, as long as these measures do not breach the disciplines set forth in the [TBT] Agreement. Many of the disciplines in the TBT agreement are essentially identical to those in the SPS agreement [including the obligation to notify and allow for comments on proposed standards affecting trade], but the TBT Agreement explicitly states that SPS measures are bound only by the terms of the SPS agreement.”

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25 *Overview of Foreign Technical Barriers to U.S. Agricultural Exports.*
Dispute Settlement Provisions

As noted, governments can, and often do, resolve SPS (and other trade) disagreements informally through bilateral and multilateral discussions, usually among technical experts (e.g., scientists, health professionals) and, if necessary, higher-level trade officials. Those which cannot be resolved may be elevated to formally established dispute procedures. Within the WTO, these procedures are spelled out in another UR agreement called the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Under the pre-UR dispute settlement procedures, a country involved in the dispute could effectively block a decision against it, which is not permissible under the current procedures.

If a WTO dispute settlement panel ultimately determines that a country’s SPS (or TBT) measure, for example, is inconsistent with WTO obligations, and WTO members adopt the panel or any appellate body report, the defending country is expected to withdraw the measure. Compensation and retaliation are available as temporary remedies. If compensation is not provided to the complaining country by the defending country, and the two still fail to reach a mutually acceptable solution, the WTO panel can authorize trade retaliation if the complaining country so requests. Such retaliation generally takes the form of higher tariffs against a portion of the defending country’s exports to the complaining country.26

WTO Reviews of the SPS Agreement

The WTO SPS Agreement provides for a periodic review, by the SPS committee, of the agreement’s operation and implementation. The first review was conducted in March 1999; a second, the most recent, was in June 2005. Although the agreement had been in force for 10 years at the time of this second review, the committee reported that some WTO members were “still in the process of adjusting to and implementing the new disciplines.” Nonetheless, the agreement has benefitted both importing and exporting nations. No member has proposed changes to the basic provisions or questioned its science-based requirements.27

During these two reviews, the committee discussed at length the range of SPS issues and proposals, from equivalence, transparency, and harmonization in standards among countries to technical assistance and special and differential treatment for development countries and dispute resolution. Also discussed at the second review were specific trade-related SPS concerns raised by WTO members, cooperation within the three standard-setting bodies (Codex, OIE, and IPPC), and clarification of terms and SPS provisions, among other topics. The 2005 report includes recommendations on each of these topics.

26 For more on dispute settlement, see CRS Report RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: An Overview, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.

Over the first 10 years of the SPS agreement, various members had brought 204 specific SPS trade problems to the committee. Fifty-six of them were reported by WTO to have been resolved. By subject, 40% were related to animal health, 29% to plant health, 27% to food safety, and 4% to other concerns.

Not all of these disputes were raised to the level of a formal complaint, however. Of the more than 300 trade disputes of all types that were formally brought to the WTO’s dispute settlement system from 1995-2004, 30 have been alleged violations of the SPS agreement. Appendix B lists these SPS disputes and their status as of May 2006.

**Doha Development Agenda**

The November 2001 Doha Declaration launched the most recent round of multilateral negotiations to reform trade. This round has not yet been concluded, in part because WTO members have been unable to settle their wide differences over how to further reform trade in agricultural products. Negotiators are attempting to reach agreement across three broadly inclusive agricultural “pillars”: export subsidies, domestic support, and market access.28

The 1994 SPS agreement itself is not being renegotiated. However, the Doha Declaration does instruct governments to address a variety of SPS implementation issues and concerns which were raised mainly by developing countries. More specifically, the Doha Declaration:

- clarifies that in the 1994 SPS agreement, the “longer timeframe” given to developing countries to comply with other countries’ new SPS measures is normally meant to be at least six months;
- clarifies that the 1994 agreement’s “reasonable interval” between publication of a country’s new SPS measure and its entry into force should also mean, normally, at least six months;
- instructs the SPS committee to develop expeditiously a more specific program for all countries to make use of the agreement’s equivalency provisions;
- directs the SPS committee to review the operation of the agreement at least once every four years;
- urges the WTO Director-General to continue to facilitate developing countries’ participation in the development of international SPS standards; and
- encourages WTO members to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance to enable least-developed countries to implement the SPS agreement and to respond to measures that could impair their trade.

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SPS Provisions in Regional and Bilateral Agreements

Bilateral and regional agreements between the United States and other countries also can contain references to SPS and TBT matters (see Table 1). However, with the exception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), such provisions generally are not as extensive as in the UR agreements.

These FTAs do not directly address any specific SPS disputes or issues between the United States and the other countries. But U.S. negotiators at times have taken advantage of the negotiating sessions leading up to an agreement, or the subsequent ratification and implementation period, to raise and attempt to resolve such outstanding issues.

For example, during the U.S.-Australia FTA negotiations, U.S. officials secured a commitment from Australia that it would work to ease inspection procedures that have impeded U.S. imports of pork, citrus, apples and stone fruit. In a side letter to the 2006 proposed U.S.-Peru FTA, Peru pledges to use international standards in opening its markets to U.S. beef and pork. Similar side letters accompany recent FTAs with other Latin American countries.

Foreign countries also have used the FTA arena to press their own concerns about U.S. SPS measures or TBTs. For example, in a side letter to the pending U.S.-Colombia FTA, the United States agreed to meet on the issue of labeling non-Colombian coffee as Colombian.

Recently concluded trade agreements have contained a reference to each party’s rights and obligations under the WTO SPS agreement, and some have established standing committees to consult on and resolve SPS problems on an ongoing basis. These provisions generally reflect U.S. SPS objectives which the Administration has enunciated in letters notifying Congress of its intent to negotiate various FTAs. Besides the agreements discussed in Table 1, negotiations were underway or starting for FTAs with Panama, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.
### Table 1. SPS Provisions in FTAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>SPS Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American FTA:</strong> NAFTA, between United States, Canada, and Mexico, entered into force Jan. 1, 1994.</td>
<td>SPS provisions contained in Section B of Chapter Seven, Agriculture and SPS Measures; much more extensive than in other bilateral and regional FTAs. Generally parallel provisions in UR SPS agreement. Also contains (in Chapter 20) dispute resolution mechanism for challenging SPS barriers. Those bringing dispute can choose either the WTO or NAFTA process; in SPS cases, respondent can steer dispute into NAFTA arena under certain circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Israel FTA:</strong> Earliest FTA took effect Sept. 1, 1985.</td>
<td>Article 9 (Health) directs two sides to review their veterinary and plant health rules to ensure they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner and do not obstruct trade. Also calls for consultations over any difficulties to “...allow trade in agricultural products insofar as they do not endanger animal and plant health.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Jordan FTA:</strong> Entered into force Dec. 17, 2001.</td>
<td>No SPS section. However, a separate Joint Statement on WTO Issues recognizes encourages consultations on SPS equivalence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Singapore FTA:</strong> Effective Jan. 1, 2004.</td>
<td>No SPS section, but declares in preamble both parties’ commitment to reduction of technical and SPS barriers to trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Chile FTA:</strong> Effective Jan. 1, 2004.</td>
<td>Chapter Six reaffirms both countries’ rights and obligations under WTO SPS Agreement; also establishes bilateral committee to enhance understanding of each’s SPS measures and to consult extensively and regularly on SPS matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Australia FTA:</strong> Entered into force Jan. 1, 2005.</td>
<td>Chapter VII reaffirms both countries’ rights and obligations under WTO SPS Agreement; establishes committee like that in Chile FTA. Further directs USDA-APHIS and counterpart, Biosecurity Australia, to chair standing technical working group intended to address, on an ongoing basis, all trade-related SPS matters that arise during each country’s rulemaking and risk assessment processes. Side letters agree to cooperate on securing science-based international standards on BSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Morocco FTA:</strong> Took effect Jan. 1, 2006.</td>
<td>Chapter 3-B reaffirms rights and obligations of both parties under the WTO SPS agreement. No SPS committee. Side letter intended to facilitate exports of U.S. beef and poultry by addressing Morocco’s concerns about antibiotics and other substances in beef and poultry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American FTA:</strong> Between United States, Dominican Republic (DR), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, approved by Congress in 2005; currently in effect between U.S. and El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua.</td>
<td>DR-CAFTA reaffirms all parties’ rights and obligations under WTO SPS agreement, establishes standing SPS committee like that in the Chile and Australia agreements, but further specifies which agencies in each country to be represented. Side letters with Costa Rica and El Salvador agree to cooperate with the United States on scientific and technical work to achieve market access for poultry. U.S. side letter with DR states that the DR “shall not grant or deny import licenses based on sanitary or phytosanitary concerns, domestic purchasing requirements, or discretionary criteria. [DR] shall enforce any sanitary or phytosanitary measures that it imposes separately from its import-licensing system.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Agreement | SPS Provisions
--- | ---
**U.S.-Bahrain FTA:** Signed into law Jan. 11, 2006, not yet in force. | SPS chapter (Six) reaffirms two countries’ rights and obligations under the WTO SPS agreement. No SPS committee.

**Proposed U.S.-Andean Nations FTA:** Agreement with Peru signed Apr. 12, 2006; Colombia negotiations completed Feb. 26, 2006. | Chapter Six in both agreements reaffirms parties’ rights and obligations under the WTO SPS agreement and creates a standing committee to address SPS matters. Each has S&P side letters attached to agreement. (With progress stalled on a regional FTA, the United States has worked to forge bilateral agreements with the Andean nations.)

**Proposed U.S.-Oman FTA:** Signed Jan. 19, 2006. | Both parties reaffirm their rights and obligations under WTO SPS agreement. No SPS committee.

Source: USTR, and CRS Report RL31356 (Cooper).

### Other Opportunities for Addressing SPS Issues

Besides the broader trade agreements cited above, the United States and other governments frequently employ other types of mutual agreements, memoranda, and letters to deal specifically with SPS-related concerns and/or to formalize mutually acceptable conditions for trade in food and agricultural goods. The following are some notable examples of these arrangements.

**The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol.** The protocol, an outgrowth of the 1992 U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), is a multilateral agreement intended to provide for the safe handling, transfer, and international movement of living modified organisms. Nearly 100 countries have signed the protocol, which enables countries to obtain information about biotech organisms before they are imported and recognizes countries’ right to regulate them consistent with international agreements, among other provisions. Because the United States is not a party to the 1992 CBD, it cannot be a party to the protocol, but it attempts to work with the ratifying countries to ensure that implementation does not harm U.S. exports.  

**U.S.-EU Veterinary Equivalency Agreement.** The United States and the EU signed this agreement in July 1999. It is aimed at facilitating trade, through mutual recognition by each party that the other’s SPS standards for animal products — even where not identical — provide an equivalent level of protection to public and animal health. The agreement has preserved several billion dollars annually in two-way trade in animals and products, according to USDA. Despite the agreement, U.S. exporters continue to encounter major barriers to a number of important products. For example, none of the EU’s average of $1.2 billion in annual poultry imports is coming from the United States, a major world supplier. The EU’s 1997 ban on the

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use of anti-microbial treatments for sanitizing poultry carcasses effectively halted US poultry exports to the EU, even though the use of anti-microbial treatments is approved by FDA.\textsuperscript{30}

**Bilateral Market Access Agreements.** One of the steps required of countries seeking to join the WTO is the completion of bilateral market access agreements with other countries. On May 31, 2006, the United States signed such an agreement with Vietnam. Part of that agreement commits Vietnam to recognize the U.S. beef, pork, and poultry inspection as equivalent to its own; to implement regulations governing shelf-life and biotechnology in a non-trade disruptive manner; and to resume trade in U.S. bone-in beef and beef offal from animals under 30 months of age. Similar accession negotiations between the United States and Russia have been underway in 2006, and SPS measures are among the key issues being discussed for inclusion. SPS concerns have been among the ostensible reasons that Russia, an important U.S. protein export market, has periodically delayed or blocked U.S. product exports, notably poultry.

**Concluding Observations**

U.S. government and WTO reports and press releases frequently cite the benefits of the SPS and TBT agreements and progress made, under these agreements, in resolving disputes and facilitating trade between countries. However, some, among them food safety and environmental advocacy organizations, and groups that have more broadly opposed efforts toward globalization and toward harmonization of world trading rules, have long expressed skepticism. They have argued that implementation of the agreements can result in “downward harmonization” rather than upgraded health and safety standards. This can happen when, for example, a WTO dispute settlement panel questions the scientific underpinnings of a U.S. safeguard, and/or the United States agrees to an effectively lower standard in order to bring trade negotiations with another country to a successful conclusion.\textsuperscript{31}

Others counter that the current trade agreements explicitly recognize the right of individual nations, as well as states and localities, to enact stronger protections than international guidelines if they believe they are appropriate. The United States is especially well-positioned against challenges, because its health and safety policies are scientifically defensible, U.S. officials have argued.

The WTO itself has asserted that countries can “to some extent apply the ‘precautionary principle,’ a kind of ‘safety first’ approach” where scientific


\textsuperscript{31} Such arguments were explored, for example, in a speech by Bruce Silverglade, Director of Legal Affairs at the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a consumer advocacy organization. Entitled “Should the SPS Agreement Be Amended? A Modest Proposal to Restore Public Support,” it was delivered April 4, 1998, at a public policy conference at Georgetown University. Accessed at [http://www.cspinet.org/reports/sps.htm].
uncertainty exists. More specifically, the precautionary principle suggests that if scientific evidence is insufficient or inconclusive regarding a practice’s or product’s potential dangers to human, environmental, animal, or plant health, that product or practice should be prohibited if there are reasonable grounds for concern. The EU has been criticized by U.S. and other interests for shielding itself behind this principle to impose otherwise scientifically unsupported barriers to food imports that exporting nations deem to be safe. On the other hand, some advocates believe that the SPS agreement too severely limits use of the principle.

The effectiveness and flexibility of the SPS and TBT rules also are likely to be tested by rapidly emerging changes in food production technology, such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. Neither appeared to be imminent concerns when the agreements were finalized in 1994. Many believe that the SPS and TBT agreements provide the foundation for developing transparent, science-based trade guidelines, as well as an effective framework for resolving disputes in these areas. Others have argued that the Doha round should have revisited the agreements more closely with regard to these or other new technologies.

Nanotechnology may provide the next test of existing international SPS rules. A recent Duke Law and Technology Review article argues that measures regulating trade in nanotechnology likely would be subject to the SPS agreement and that it could be used to objectively balance the relative risks and benefits of trade in nanotechnology products. But, as the same article cautions, nanoparticles can present unique health and environmental risks.

The President must submit all FTAs to Congress, which in turn must pass implementing legislation if the United States is to participate. FTAs have become a significant U.S. trade policy tool. Each one can affect the U.S. economy, including the food and agricultural sector, and the impact will vary across the range of crop and livestock products traded between the United States and another FTA signatory.

Many Members of Congress are already following closely a number of ongoing SPS-related trade disputes that, they believe, have negatively affected agricultural producers in their states and districts. Also, lawmakers have expressed concern that

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32 Source: WTO, *Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures*. These are addressed in Article 5.7, Article 3.3, and the preamble of the SPS agreement.

33 Friends of the Earth International, *Trade and People’s Food Sovereignty*, position paper, April 2003, accessed at [http://www.foei.org/publications/pdfs/newfinalallowres.pdf]. The document also charged that “the Codex is so heavily influenced by food and chemical corporations that the standards it sets may be lower than those already in place in many nations.”

as recently signed trade agreements lower agricultural tariffs, countries may turn more and more to SPS measures to protect their farmers from import competition. These Members have stated that SPS matters will be among the factors they will consider in voting for new FTAs.
Appendix A. Selected SPS Concerns Between the United States and Top 25 Agricultural Trade Partners, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Partner</th>
<th>Total Trade (Two-Way)</th>
<th>Exports To</th>
<th>Imports From</th>
<th>Selected U.S. SPS Concerns</th>
<th>Selected Foreign SPS Concerns About U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$22,837</td>
<td>$10,570</td>
<td>$12,267</td>
<td>Fortified foods (e.g., cereals, orange juice) regulated as drugs.</td>
<td>Mandatory retail country of origin labeling (COOL) for specified food commodities (only seafood implemented to date); longstanding complaint on S. Dakota and other state bans on entry of Canadian cattle, swine and grain trucks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>20,168</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>13,334</td>
<td>Longstanding problems with EU’s oversight of biotech, including delayed approvals, restrictive labeling, traceability, and co-existence rules, and contradictory policies by many Member States. Barriers to animal product trade include EU meat hormone directive (not based on science), U.S. poultry meat restrictions, lack of risk assessment behind some animal byproduct restrictions; unreasonable barriers to dietary supplements and to use of wood packaging materials.</td>
<td>Overly strict animal disease control rules, notably ban on ruminants and products due to BSE, which either lack scientific basis or do not follow OIE guidelines; non-recognition of principle of “regionalization” in animal disease outbreaks; overly strict rules on how EU meat exporters handle meat products from countries not recognized as disease-free; continuing obstacles to EU exports of potted plants; long process to gain import approvals for new agricultural products; delays in Customs sampling and inspection of perishable foods; undue SPS obstacles to imports of citrus products, plants/nursery stock. Longstanding complaint on restrictions on EU poultry imports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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35 Includes some food-related TBTs; see text for definition. This listing is intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. For example, some foreign concerns about U.S. SPS measures may be missing because more authoritative information was not readily available. Also, some issues listed here may have been resolved by this printing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Partner</th>
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<th>Selected Foreign SPS Concerns About U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>17,695</td>
<td>9,362</td>
<td>8,333</td>
<td>Inadequate live animal inspection facilities at ports; avian flu-related poultry import restrictions; other SPS barriers to such U.S. exports as beef, grains, seed products, apples, stone fruit, pork, citrus, wood and wood products, dry beans, avocados, potatoes, and eggs; SPS procedures at border do not always reflect U.S.-Mexico agreements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>8,296</td>
<td>7,874</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>Numerous, including increasing use of SPS, TBT standards to block ag imports; often not based on science or international guidelines, e.g., unwarranted fumigation of lettuce; continuing unscientific ban on U.S. beef due to BSE; burdensome, unwarranted quarantine restrictions on U.S. apples; ban on U.S. potatoes; overly restrictive food additive and feed additive rules; some biotech oversight concerns; unnecessary bans on U.S. poultry due to AI concerns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7,098</td>
<td>5,225</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>Numerous issues, including overall lack of transparency on SPS measures; concerns regarding U.S. beef and other meat and poultry, food additives, food labeling rules, California plums, biotechnology.</td>
<td>Mandatory retail COOL for specified food commodities, (only seafood implemented to date); failure to expeditiously lift suspension of Chinese imports of Ya pears due to fungus concerns; failure to distinguish BSE status of country in imposing BSE-related import requirements; U.S. rule on importation of artificially dwarfed potted plants from China not necessary and not viable given China’s production system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2,882</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>Stringent SPS regime; bans on U.S. ag products include Florida citrus, stone fruit, poultry meat, and apples; biotechnology issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>Total Trade (Two-Way)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>Burdensome registration and testing requirements for all food imports; continuing ban on U.S. beef and ruminant products due to BSE; proposed certification and testing plan for imported fruits; new biotech labeling rules.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2,488</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>Plant and animal quarantine measures not always based on sound science, unnecessarily trade restrictive;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>2,226</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>Overly restrictive food safety standards; continuing ban on U.S. beef due to BSE; not using regionalization in animal health rules; burdensome labeling requirements including on biotech products; specific problems with functional and organic foods imports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>Many SPS issues including biotech; bans on U.S. low-risk beef; poultry and poultry products; Western U.S. wheat.</td>
<td>Concerns about food facility registration and shipment pre-notification provisions of U.S. Bioterrorism Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>Pet foods, cattle and beef, nutritional supplements.</td>
<td>Concerns about the labeling of non-Columbian coffee as Columbian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>Several biotechnology issues, including onerous labeling requirements; restrictive SPS controls for virtually all ag imports; specific issues affecting U.S. pork, beef, poultry exports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>Burdensome, unclear food import/safety rules.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>Food import rules; ban on some U.S. beef products; biotech issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>Poor record of transparency, WTO notification with regard to SPS measures; lack of scientific basis for some; de facto bans on animal and animal product imports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>BSE-related restrictions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>Total Trade (Two-Way)</td>
<td>Exports To</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>Product registration requirements can be barriers; may be inconsistently enforced; with new FTA, Guatemala will recognize the equivalence of the U.S. food safety and inspection system, thereby eliminating the need for plant-by-plant inspections for meat, poultry, and dairy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>Numerous issues including failure to notify WTO of SPS measures; need to base such measures on science and global standards; problems affecting imports of U.S. almonds, pulses, fresh fruits and vegetables, plus poultry and products, pet food, bovine semen, and dairy products; no biotechnology policy.</td>
<td>Generally strict and burdensome SPS requirements; delays at labs testing processed food imports; concerns about food facility registration and shipment pre-notification provisions of U.S. Bioterrorism Act; longstanding ban on uncooked meat products even from disease-free regions; fresh dairy products (e.g. yogurt) banned due to Grade A certification difficulties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>Complex, bureaucratic import procedures for all ag products and foods; SPS measures not based on science or international standards, notably affecting U.S. meat and poultry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>Nutritional labeling issues; concerns about meat and poultry requirements for halal (Islamic practices) approval.</td>
<td>U.S. Bioterrorism Act concerns including implementation costs and liability issue; risk analysis/approval process for tropical fruit and vegetable imports needs to be streamlined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Oft-shifting rules and inconsistent enforcement; bans on variety of U.S. ag imports seemingly without scientific basis; particular concerns about U.S. pork, poultry, beef, other animal products. Need to bring Russia into international conformance before accession to WTO.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>Total Trade (Two-Way)</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>BSE-related restrictions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Poultry part imports banned; others including beef, apples and pears subject to SPS measures that are non-transparent and burdensome. (e.g., meat products must come directly from country of origin.)</td>
<td>Failure to distinguish BSE status of country in imposing BSE-related import requirements; inadequate notification period for complying with import requirements for wood packaging material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>Concerns regarding U.S. beef, citrus fruit, pears, cherries, sweetbreads, seed potatoes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>Lengthy and unpredictable approval process for sanitary permits for shipments of U.S. meat and dairy products; sanitary measures not based on science or international standards, affecting U.S. meat, poultry and rice exports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD</td>
<td>$122,221</td>
<td>$62,939</td>
<td>$59,282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Appendix B. WTO Formal Disputes Invoking SPS Agreement**
(italics indicate complaint referred to a WTO dispute settlement panel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complaining Country</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Nature of Complaint (WTO dispute number)</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Inspection procedures for fresh fruits (WT/DS3)</td>
<td>Mutually satisfactory solution notified July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Inspection procedures for fresh fruits (WT/DS41)</td>
<td>Mutually satisfactory solution notified July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Shelf-life requirements for frozen processed meats and other products (WT/DS5)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified July 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Import restrictions on fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon (WT/DS18)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified May 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Import restrictions on fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon (WT/DS21)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed settlement notified November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Restrictions on treatment methods for bottled water (WT/DS20)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified April 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>EC (EU)</td>
<td>Prohibition of meat from animals treated with growth-promoting hormones (WT/DS26)</td>
<td>Suspension of concessions authorized July 26, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Prohibition of meat from animals treated with growth-promoting hormones (WT/DS48)</td>
<td>Same panel handled both complaints (see above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>“Varietal testing” requirement for fresh fruits (WT/DS76)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Quantitative restrictions on agricultural and other products (WT/DS96)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified April 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Restrictions on poultry imports (WT/DS100)</td>
<td>Consultations requested August 18, 1997; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaining Country</td>
<td>Target Country</td>
<td>Nature of Complaint (WTO dispute number)</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>BSE-related restrictions on cattle and meat (WT/DS133)</td>
<td>Consultations requested May 11, 1998; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Restrictions on rice imports (WT/DS134)</td>
<td>Consultations requested May 28, 1998; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Canada</em></td>
<td><em>EC</em></td>
<td><em>French measures affecting asbestos (WT/DS135)</em></td>
<td><em>SPS agreement not invoked in the reports</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Restrictions due to pine wood nematodes (WT/DS137)</td>
<td>Consultations requested June 17, 1998; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>State restrictions on movement of trucks carrying live animals and grains (WT/DS144)</td>
<td>Consultations requested September 25, 1998; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Measures affecting trade in live swine (WT/DS203)</td>
<td>Consultations requested July 10, 2000; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>GMO-related prohibitions on imports of canned tuna with soybean oil (WT/DS205)</td>
<td>Consultations requested September 22, 2000; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Import requirements for fresh fruit, especially bananas (WT/DS237)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified November 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>U.S.</em></td>
<td><em>Japan</em></td>
<td><em>Restrictions on apples due to fire blight (WT/DS245)</em></td>
<td><em>Dispute panel established July 2004; found Japanese restrictions are contrary to SPS agreement July 2005</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>BSE-related restrictions on pet food imports (WT/DS256)</td>
<td>Consultations requested May 3 2002; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Restrictions on fresh fruits and vegetables, including bananas (WT/DS270)</td>
<td>Panel established August 2003; reports not yet circulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Restrictions on pineapple (WT/DS271)</td>
<td>Consultations requested October 18, 2002; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Export and import policy (WT/DS279)</td>
<td>Consultations requested December 23, 2002; pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Phytosanitary restrictions on black beans (WT/DS284)</td>
<td>Mutually agreed solution notified March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaining Country</td>
<td>Target Country</td>
<td>Nature of Complaint (WTO dispute number)</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Quarantine regime (WT/DS287)</td>
<td>Panel established November 2003; reports not yet circulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Moratorium on approvals on marketing of biotech products (WT/DS291)</td>
<td>Panel established August 2003; same panel handled three complaints; WTO dispute panel interim confidential report ruled February 7, 2006 that a moratorium had existed, that bans on EU-approved GE crops in six EU member countries violated WTO rules, and that EU failed to ensure that its approval procedures were conducted without “undue delay.” Other U.S. claims rejected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Moratorium on approvals on marketing of biotech products (WT/DS292)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Moratorium on approvals on marketing of biotech products (WT/DS293)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE)-related restrictions on live animals and meat products (WT/DS297)</td>
<td>Consultations requested July 2003; pending</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
