With the growing concern over the traditional ISDS system, it is highly unlikely that the AfCFTA will include an ISDS mechanism giving investors access to go to international arbitration under conventional international tribunals.
African states need to take a unified and proactive approach to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), in order to make a system that is fairer to Africa and more consistent.
Amidst the global risk of ISDS claims, it is incumbent to shed light on Bangladesh’s BIT structure and its feasibility to confront ISDS claims in the backdrop of Covid-19 regulatory space.
In the face of the increasing number of claims brought by investors against host states on the basis of BITs and the exorbitant amounts awarded to investors, Morocco has undertaken a review of its model BIT using a flexible and rational approach.
The EU Commission has launched a public consultation calling for comments on its initiative to improve the protection of intra-EU investment. This initiative could lead to the adoption of new rules enhancing investors’ rights vis-à-vis EU Member States and to the creation of new enforcement mechanisms for investors within the EU.
In recent years, observers have questioned whether investor–state arbitration will or should be a feature of the next generation of free trade and bilateral investment treaties.
An updated European Commission proposal to reform the Energy Charter Treaty is falling short of what’s needed to reinstate governments’ “right to regulate” in areas like climate change, activists say.
This is Brazil’s 10th and India’s 4th bilateral investment agreement since both nations had adopted their Model Bilateral Investment Treaty.
Because of changing attitudes with regard to "expansive" investor protections contained in current treaties, investors need to think ahead and negotiate for the necessary protections to be included in investment contracts.
Given the present widespread dissatisfaction with investor–State dispute settlement, the ECOWAS Court can provide an alternative to arbitration that is already up and running.
For developing countries, governing foreign direct investment through IIAs and ISDS corresponds to a policy model discredited by years of social and economic failures.
The tribunal dismissed the claimants’ invocation of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT on jurisdictional grounds.
The basis of a claim in ISDS is always the applicable international investment agreement. There would always be differences and inconsistencies with an appellate mechanism.
As observers of the UNCITRAL process, we watch the debates with great interest, writing about the emergence of different camps, giving perspectives on how the process fits within broader geopolitical developments, and offering potential models for moving forward.
We civil society organizations and trade unions from the African continent express our concerns about the proposal presented by the European Union to establish a multilateral investment court and support further reaching reforms of ISDS.
The UNCITRAL Working Group III turned squarely to designing permanent institutions: a standing appellate mechanism and a multilateral investment court (MIC).
The US government used to be the chief proponent of strong investor protection clauses in international trade deals. No longer. What happened?
In investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS), ironies do occasionally occur. Sometimes they’re bitter. Sometimes they’re carbon-intensive. Sometimes they’re radioactive.
Global investment governance needs to be redesigned for the 21st century, with people and the planet at the core.
In the end, states have the power to decide collectively what reforms to pursue, in what order and in what form. Individually, they will also have choice about which particular reform options to adopt.