It’s mostly about this chapter on public procurement: www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/doc6.pdf
One part of the issue is that the US wants (wanted) to include anti-corruption provisions that go beyond TPP but the EU doesn’t have the mandate to negotiate corruption matters. Anti-corruption provisions are the competency of member states.
Why were TTIP negotiations sticking on anticorruption? Who wanted to achieve what and who didn’t agree?
Dehors les APE !
Dans le cadre d’une association "Peuples solidaires-Action aid" j’ai travaillé sur ces APE et depuis le début je suis les articles de J.BErthelot.
Déjà les traités internationaux mettent à mal l’agriculture dans n’importe quel pays du monde, mais dans le cas de l’Afrique, c’est la survie
des populations qui est en jeu.
Ce résumé me redonne sérénité, merci de tenir bon au regard de ce qui est écrit.
Bertile Boucard ex étudiante de la Sorbonne en Ethnologie.
1.Foreign direct investment is incommensurably higher in countries that fully respect the rule of law. In the others, only a form of ISDS can afford some guarantees and secure the investments these countries eagerly need. More investment guarantees attracts more investment. De facto discrimination against an investor is not insurable.
2.Modern investment treaties (like relevant CETA clauses) explicitly safeguard parties’ sovereign right to legislate for the protection of human, environment, consumers, social and cultural rights etc. No arbitration panel could ignore or overstep such clear limit to their adjudication competences.
3.Adopting a form of ISDS does not prevent recipient states to streghten their judicial process to fight investors (national or foreigners) misconduct;
4.No obligation to respect human, social, environmental etc. rights: false in the new ISDS agreements/clauses - see above-; no restriction to access: false: see the considerable access restrictions (e.g. no possible claim for missing of expected benefit, need for real economic activity in the host country etc. etc.) in CETA and Investment Court proposal.
5.No respect for domestic courts: is an investor de facto expropriated from his business by an obligation to hand over his intellectual property rights in China, by the abrupt and discriminative cutting of electricity or oil in Russia, by an abrupt and discriminative prohibition to operate in some African countries etc., whenever hurting local interests, able to rely with due process on local courts? Are the Hungarian courts going to protect an investor in culture/education as Soros against the manoeuvres of Orban? Would Bulgarian courts certainly protect a foreign investor against a public discrimination inspired by local competitors?
6.Same arbitrators: arbitrators are, by definition, corrupt? Better choose arbitrators with no knowledge of investment law?
7. Regulatory chill: current ISDS formulas (see above) target only de facto or legal expropriation chill, yet with considerable limits;
8.Locking in ISDS: ISDS exist since decades. A small country like Belgium has "old" ISDS clauses in eighty agreements with third countries. Spectacular abuses of such clauses have existed- most turned down by arbitrators. But current EU proposals considerably discipline possible abuses;
9. Undermining reform: a non partisan and informed reading of EU proposals leads to conlude that they are the most possible equilibrated and fair solution;
10. Is there anyone on earth thinking that the EUCJ - in light of its 2/15 Opinion- might crush the new ISDS formula?
si l’Algérie ne dénonce pas cet accord bilateral malgré le manqué à gagner c’est qu’il leur est quand meme utile....
This thought has possibilities. It has the merit of potentially keeping out of power any local politicians who doesn’t subscribe to it. An ingenious move if it can be implemented.
Kiaora Jacinda please do not submit our country to TPPA? Our country is at risk of losing our sovereignty. Maori can help build homes on their lands to support our homeless as a way of keeping our lands. Can you hear our people’s views first.
Aparentemente se puede decir que ahora los colombianos vamos a tener más arroz y por supuesto más barato, pero las apariencias engañan y lo que se ve en realidad es al gremio de los arroceros agricultores quebrado, aunque el gremio de arroceros empresarios, o sea los dueños de molinos o silos de almacenamiento más ricos y explotadores.
Vivimos actualmente la crisis de los agricultores del arroz por lo que según dicen ellos mismos, los dueños de los molinos o silos, les compran el arroz con una serie de condiciones que los afectan en gran medida, a pesar que el gobierno fijó unos incentivos para la producción, que manejan los empresarios dueños de los molinos, utilizando tales recursos que en principio eran de los agricultores, para hacer préstamos a los agricultores con el cobro de intereses, además les fijan los precios de compra, añadiendo a esto que tienen fórmula de tasación según la cual, únicamente les pagan por arroz entero, el partido no lo pagan; pero los empresarios si lo cobran, que ventajosos.
En resumen, podemos deducir que los TLC., contrario a lo que se creía, traen más desventajas que ventajas para los países en desarrollo, atrazando o frenando el desarrollo que se supone debían jalonar.
So the government will not lose because, as the journalist writes " ISDS process was designed to protect corporations’ interests", but more so for the lucid reasons the Thai academics provided - the government shut down the mine without conducting environmental or health tests. Unbiased reporting would be nice (for a change)...
I have to really wonder who our government is really supporting, because it certainly isn’t the Canadian people. Trudeau is adament about keeping in the ISDS clause in NAFTA and it will be no different with the TPP. The fact that they are negotiating the TPP in secrecy only adds to their desire to exclude the Canadian public from consulting on this "trade’ deal.
You have to really wonder about Trudeau’s vociferous promotion of these deals and his insistence that the ISDS clause stay intact. What we are really witnessing is Trudeau and the liberal party handing over the control and governence of Canada over to a group of corporate/financial/military/elites. This also includes the U.S. elites,particularly when it comes to Canadian foreign policy.
This neocon elite group are Trudeau’s and the liberal parties ADVISORS and they have an agenda. Domestically it is economic
neoliberalism and in foreign policy it is complete subservience to U.S. economic and military global imperialism. It is this group and only this group that determines policy.
Trudeau and his government have betrayed the Canadian people on a scale that knows no equal.
There is no reference to Mode 4 in this interview which is surely always the main demand of India: it was in the years of negotiating an EU/India FTA and still is now, whenever such a deal is mentioned. It is, at the same time, a major stumbling block for EU governments.
Mode 4 is the temporary movement of workers across borders to fulfill service contracts, often seen, with good reason, as a cheap labour mechanism. The EU offers it in all its trade deals, stipulating ’skilled workers’. However India demands a very broad spectrum of categories. Once granted, with categories defined, Mode 4 concessions, by definition, cannot be subject to labour needs tests, ie if outside workers are actually needed, nor to quotas or numerical limits.
The Commission always avoids referring to Mode 4 saying quickly that it is ’sensitive’ if it is mentioned.
But it’s not mentioned here in this interview either, despite being central to any deal.
There are contradictions, on the one hand, between the fact to acknowledge that China’s exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been 5 times larger than those of the US in 2015 and the fact that AGOA text criticizes "the unfair practices by the European Union that condition African access to the European market on signing imbalanced and substandard trade agreements" and, on the other hand, to pressure SSA countries to "eliminate barriers to US exports".
La remarque dans l’article selon laquelle les parlements des Etats membres doivent encore approuver l’entrée en vigueur définitive du CETA n’est pas correcte. Une telle approbation n’aurait été requise, selon la Cour de Justice de l’UE, que si l’accord avait maintenu la clause d’arbitrage investisseur/Etat hôte (ISDS).
Mais celle-ci est définitivement morte. UE et Canada se sont entendus pour qu’elle soit retirée de l’application provisoire et ne figurera pas dans le texte adopté définitivement. Le système devrait être remplacé par une juridiction professionnelle. Le CETA est désormais entièrement "compétence exclusive" de l’Europe, son adoption relevant des deux seuls organes de l’UE, à savoir le Conseil des Ministres et le Parlement Européen.
What a confusion in that note!!! ISDS is clearly and definitively dead in EU agreements. The European Court made it clear in its Singapore opinion (in fact a decision) that any EU trade agreement containing an ISDS clause needs clearance not only by the European Parliament and the 28 national governments but also by the national parliaments of the 28 MS (38 assemblies on last count). The CETA saga has demonstrated that this is next to politically impossible. Hence, the European Commission is certainly no longer trying to include such clause on pain of seeing its full trade agreements turned down by one or another assembly (as in CETA for purely internal political power grabbling motives). Instead, it is currently negotiating with Singapore and Canada the removal of the existing ISDS clause from the existing agreements. These, whenever provisional implementation expires, will then be ratified by the governments of the 28. Instead of ISDS Commission is proposing a judicial formula by independent international professional judges, full fledged judiciary process etc. A law setting-up such judiciary body would be totally independent from any specific trade agreement and apply horizontally and in the same way to all trade agreements. Of course, the setting-up of such body is clearly not part of the EU exclusive competences and would require clearance also by all national assemblies.
Note that both the private arbiters under the past ISDS and the future judiciary were/will be constrained by the commitments and the limits thereof laid down in each specific trade agreement. The EU "new generation" trade agreements make clear that the agreements cannot affect the parties’ right to adopt and enact own legislation for the protection of environment, consumers, social rights and public services. There was/will be no question that arbiters/ future judges ever conclude or award damages that go beyond what the parties have committed or reserved. Past abuses under other trade agreements (Lucky Strike etc.) were only possible because the trade agreements in question did not contain the reserves made clear in the EU agreements.
The words "When that bid failed" suggest that the ISDS case was not launched until the High Court decision was handed down.
In fact, the ISDS action was launched before the High Court action.
The HCA action was filed on the day that the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act came into effect (1st December 2011).
The ISDS action was foreshadowed prior to that with a notice of claim in June 2011, and the formal notice of arbitration was delivered in November 2011.
In the 1 st FTA in 2006, it was almost unilateral, all concessions were for China. Pakistan suffered a huge imbalance of trade as a result.
We must set up our priorities with the close consultations of stakeholders and then negotiate with China. Chinese leadership is very sympathetic with Pakistan and sincerely wanted to resolve all issues. Generally speaking , Chinese are flexible. I am sure, if we have done our home work well, and have reasonable demands, China will accept them and accommodate Pakistan as ASEAN.
Una oprtunidad que se abre a muchos países a integrar un gran mercado que les permitirá un desarrollo sustentable a cada país y en función de sus capacidades tecnologicas y de riquezas naturales a aportar a ese gran mercado que se abre como una oportunidad de vender y crecer.
Hope it will fail...such hugw trade will never benefit any one.as all will have thier own intereat to protect...let see if india going to let go it coconut oil tarif...
Congratulation Ecuador! This has been a great study with a great result and will certainly serve as an example for many other countries. This will definitely help achieving Agenda 2030 goals far better than via the old BITs. Hopefully many countries will follow suite.
24-Jan-2018
Ministry of Development Strategies and International Trade has not conduct any feasibility study or an impact assessment of any of these FTAs. They are blindly believing that signing of those FTAs will start foreign direct investments to flourish. There are scientific and systematic approaches to assess the economic impact of a proposed preferential trade agreement. Unfortunately, people who are responsible are neither bothered to assess the impact nor to do a feasibility study, instead they are so keen to get FTAs in place with the countries which Sri Lanka is heavily importing while countries like India is keen on signing FTAs with their top exporting nations. The officials of the ministry are clueless when they are asked how the government could recover the loss to the government income due to removal of 90% of goods imported from our three main import countries.